Czech State: A Systematic Analysis of Malfunction

An analytical x-ray of Czechia’s state, exposing why democracy, administration and institutions formally work yet systematically fail to deliver real change.

Czechia is often described as a “normal” Central European democracy: regular elections, pluralistic media, functioning courts, growing economy. On paper, the state works. Yet in practice, it repeatedly fails to deliver the kind of coherent, long-term change that citizens feel and the country objectively needs.

This article starts from that paradox. Instead of focusing on individual scandals or personalities, it treats the Czech state as a system and asks a harder question: why does a formally democratic, administratively competent country struggle so much with real, structural transformation?

The analysis looks beyond familiar complaints about “politicians” or “Brussels” and follows the wiring of the system itself: how government is steered, how the civil service functions, how money and responsibility move between Prague and municipalities, how oversight, media and evidence actually work in practice. The goal is not to assign blame, but to understand where the machine is structurally misaligned.

At the top, the state suffers from weak strategic steering. Governments produce strategies, visions and programmes, but lack a strong, institutional centre capable of turning them into a few clear national missions, aligning ministries around them and sustaining them across electoral cycles. Fragmented priorities meet fragmented administration.

Below that, administrative culture pushes officials toward formal compliance rather than outcomes. Risk-aversion, legalism and systemic alibism encourage behaviour that is personally safe but collectively paralysing. Even talented people quickly learn that sticking strictly to procedure is rewarded more than solving real problems.

The civil service and multi-level governance arrangements then compound the problem. Politicised senior appointments, rigid pay and career structures, thousands of tiny municipalities with uneven capacity and a confusing mix of delegated state functions and local self-government all make it hard to design and execute coherent reforms from centre to periphery.

Finally, the wider ecosystem around the state – oversight institutions, public procurement rules, the party system, information environment, media, disinformation and weak evidence–policy links – shapes incentives in ways that punish long-term responsibility and reward short-term optics. The state can formally decide many things, but struggles to build legitimacy, design well, learn from failure and stay the course.

What follows is an analytical breakdown of these weaknesses, grouped into interconnected domains. The aim is to map where Czechia’s democracy and administration are structurally underpowered, and to prepare the ground for a different conversation: not just about what policies the state should pursue, but about how to rebuild its basic capacity to act.

Summary

Group A – Strategic Steering & Whole-of-Government Direction

A1. Structural pattern

• Fragmented ministerial system with weak centre-of-government (CoG) functions.

• Limited capacity to set a few clear national missions and align everything else with them.

• Strategic documents exist in abundance, but with:

  • overlapping priorities,

  • weak implementation mechanisms,

  • poor cross-ministerial coherence.

A2. How it manifests

• Many sectoral strategies (education, digitalisation, climate, regional development, etc.) coexist without a strong hierarchy or integration.

• The central coordination units (Government Office, central analytical units) are understaffed or underpowered to enforce alignment:

  • they can “comment” and “coordinate”, but not truly steer.

• EU funds and national budgets are often managed in siloed ways, which makes them look like many parallel programmes instead of one joined-up investment story.

• Strategic initiatives frequently restart after elections:

  • new branding,

  • some re-design,

  • partial abandonment of the previous cycle.

A3. Impact on actionability

• The state struggles to define 5–7 long-term missions (e.g. climate-resilient economy, digital state, healthy & ageing society, housing & infrastructure, AI & innovation, security & defence) and then:

  • drive them consistently,

  • across governments,

  • with clear KPIs and accountability.

• Ministries and agencies optimise for their own sectoral agendas, which:

  • multiplies transaction costs,

  • produces conflicting regulations,

  • and slows down system-wide reforms.

• Long-term reforms are fragile: their survival depends on the goodwill of individual ministers rather than on a strong, institutional centre.

A4. System linkages

• Weak strategic steering (A) reinforces:

  • formalism and alibism (B), because nobody owns outcomes across silos.

  • multi-level chaos (D), because local actors receive mixed signals and fragmented programmes.

  • informational noise (G), because there’s no clear, stable narrative about where the country is headed.

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Group B – Administrative Culture, Accountability & Alibism

B1. Structural pattern

• Deep-seated culture of formal compliance:

  • “Are the procedures followed?” > “Does it work?”

• Strong risk-aversion (“úřednická opatrnost”):

  • inaction or minimal action is safer than bold initiatives.

• Systemic alibism:

  • responsibilities are dispersed,

  • everyone has plausible excuses,

  • no one truly owns outcomes.

B2. How it manifests

• Programmes designed around:

  • eligibility rules,

  • reporting templates,

  • audit-proof documentation,
    rather than around clearly defined outcomes and impact metrics.

• Officials optimise for:

  • avoiding audit findings,

  • staying within formal rules,

  • shifting blame to “the law”, “Brussels”, “other departments”.

• When audits or evaluations uncover problems:

  • responses focus on tweaking forms and procedures,

  • root-cause structural redesign is rare.

• Risk-taking (even for good reasons) is personally dangerous:

  • legal uncertainty,

  • harsh ex-post scrutiny,

  • low protection for those who deviate from precedent.

B3. Impact on actionability

• Ambitious reforms are forced into low-risk, low-change shapes to avoid controversy and audit exposure.

• The system avoids learning:

  • failures are not analysed to improve design,

  • people hide or minimise problems.

• Real-world performance becomes opaque:

  • success = “we spent the funds and had no negative audit”.

• Talented, solution-oriented people:

  • burn out,

  • or leave,

  • or adapt to the alibist culture, reinforcing it.

B4. System linkages

• B amplifies:

  • A’s weak steering: even if a mission is set, the culture resists bold implementation.

  • C’s HR issues: high-performers are neither recognised nor safe.

  • E’s control system: audits focus on legality/process, feeding formalism instead of learning.

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Group C – Civil Service Professionalism, Staffing & Incentives

C1. Structural pattern

• Politicisation of top-level civil service persists despite formal depoliticisation rules.

• Pay and careers are heavily seniority-based, with weak performance differentiation.

• HR is treated as administration, not as strategic talent management.

C2. How it manifests

• Top positions are often influenced by political considerations:

  • appointment and removal linked to political cycles,

  • reorganisation used to move people out.

• Key skill domains (digital, data, AI, complex policy analysis, project management) are understaffed:

  • state can’t match private salaries,

  • career paths for specialists are shallow.

• Performance reviews exist but are often:

  • formalistic,

  • not linked to pay, promotion, or development.

• Training is:

  • fragmented,

  • often not aligned with strategic priorities,

  • more about generic courses than building capabilities for big missions.

C3. Impact on actionability

• For routine administration, the system is “good enough”.
  For complex transformation, it is under-powered:

  • insufficient analytic capacity,

  • weak project delivery skills,

  • limited change-management know-how.

• High uncertainty for ambitious civil servants:

  • their careers depend more on politics and seniority than on performance.

• The state becomes dependent on external consultants for core thinking and execution, which:

  • raises costs,

  • reduces internal learning,

  • and can misalign incentives.

C4. System linkages

• C interacts strongly with:

  • B (culture): talent adapts to risk-averse norms or exits,

  • A (steering): even if CoG wants strategy, it lacks the internal muscle,

  • D (multi-level): local administrations suffer even more from skill gaps.

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Group D – Multi-Level Governance, Territorial Fragmentation & Funding

D1. Structural pattern

• Extremely fragmented municipal layer:

  • thousands of small municipalities with limited capacity.

• Complex division of responsibilities between state administration and self-government.

• Fiscal framework and grants that often don’t align with strategic goals and capacities.

D2. How it manifests

• National strategies must be implemented through many small, unevenly capable actors:

  • huge variation in skills, resources, and professionalism.

• Municipalities and regions balance:

  • their own local priorities,

  • delegated state tasks,

  • and an often chaotic landscape of grants and EU programmes.

• Local finance:

  • partly determined by tax-sharing formulas,

  • strongly shaped by project-based subsidies that reward “grant-writing” and formal compliance, rather than strategic impact.

• Persistent complaints about:

  • unfunded mandates,

  • unclear competences,

  • unfair distribution of responsibilities.

D3. Impact on actionability

• Any mission that depends on local implementation (which is almost all: housing, climate, transport, social services, education, health infrastructure) faces:

  • thousands of small bottlenecks,

  • patchy implementation,

  • major geographic inequalities.

• The centre is forced toward low-sophistication programme design:

  • simple, generic schemes that even the weakest municipalities can implement,

  • instead of more tailored, performance-based approaches.

• Coordination costs explode:

  • ministries must manage thousands of contracts and relationships instead of dozens of strong local partners.

D4. System linkages

• D multiplies:

  • A’s fragmentation: steering signals get diluted beyond recognition at local level.

  • E’s oversight gaps: many funds flow through local entities beyond strong central audit reach.

  • B’s alibism: centre blames municipalities; municipalities blame centre.

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Group E – Oversight, Integrity & Public Procurement

E1. Structural pattern

• Strong central audit (SAO) but major blind spots (local governments, state-/municipally-owned companies).

• Anti-corruption performance: middling, not disastrous, not exemplary.

• Whistleblower protection: late, fragile, underused.

• Public procurement dominated by “lowest price”, underusing quality and innovation criteria.

E2. How it manifests

• SAO produces high-quality audits, but:

  • cannot see the full picture, especially at local and corporate periphery of the state.

• Many systemic problems appear repeatedly in audit reports:

  • design flaws,

  • weak internal controls,

  • vague objectives.

• Whistleblowing:

  • legal frameworks now exist,

  • but culture, awareness and practical protection lag behind.

• Procurement:

  • contracting authorities choose lowest price to avoid disputes,

  • complex, high-value projects are often mis-specified,

  • there are periodic scandals around manipulation and collusion.

E3. Impact on actionability

• Integrity weaknesses erode trust and therefore political space for bold reforms.

• The control system reinforces formalism:

  • officials optimise for “no legal mistakes” rather than “best value for taxpayers”.

• Whistleblowing gaps:

  • reduce the system’s ability to detect internal failures early,

  • protect “business as usual” even when it is clearly suboptimal.

• Procurement design:

  • slows down adoption of innovative solutions,

  • increases life-cycle costs,

  • makes big infrastructure and digital projects riskier and less effective.

E4. System linkages

• E locks B’s culture in place: control and fear without structured learning.

• E undermines A & C: even if a strategic centre and talented officials exist, they operate in an environment where smart risks are not properly rewarded.

• E interacts with D: local procurement and spending are weakly supervised at system level, making territorial fragmentation more dangerous.

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Group F – Political Representation, Party System & Citizens’ Voice

F1. Structural pattern

• Very low trust in political parties, government, parliament.

• Fragmented, volatile party system with strong populist players.

• Weakly institutionalised citizen participation between elections.

F2. How it manifests

• Elections produce legitimate governments, but:

  • coalition-building is complex,

  • internal coherence of coalitions is often fragile,

  • political time horizons are short.

• Anti-establishment narratives resonate strongly:

  • “they’re all the same”,

  • “nothing changes anyway”,

  • “they serve themselves, not us”.

• Participation tools:

  • petitions, protests, civic campaigns exist,

  • formal consultation often feels symbolic,

  • deliberative or co-creation mechanisms are sporadic and ad hoc.

F3. Impact on actionability

• Governments have weak political capital to push difficult reforms:

  • any pain can be exploited by populists,

  • costly, long-term changes are politically dangerous.

• Cross-party agreements on strategic issues are rare:

  • every topic tends to get sucked into partisan conflict,

  • stable multi-cycle commitments are difficult to sustain.

• Citizens:

  • feel they “have no voice”,

  • disengage or radicalise,

  • treat reforms as something that is done to them, not with them.

F4. System linkages

• F amplifies:

  • A’s weak missions: no broad democratic coalition behind long-term goals.

  • G’s information disorder: distrustful citizens are more vulnerable to disinformation.

  • B’s alibism: politicians push responsibility downwards; officials push it sideways.

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Group G – Information Environment, Media & Evidence for Policy

G1. Structural pattern

• Information environment polluted by:

  • disinformation and hybrid operations,

  • low trust in media,

  • click-driven commercial incentives.

• Public service media are important but politically contested.

• Media literacy and digital skills are patchy, especially across generations.

• Evidence-informed policymaking is fragmented and under-institutionalised.

G2. How it manifests

• Foreign actors (notably Russia, but also others) exploit:

  • existing distrust,

  • social divides,

  • and historical sensitivities.

• Public debate is:

  • noisy,

  • easily polarised,

  • short on deep explanation of policy trade-offs.

• Schools:

  • offer some media/digital literacy,

  • but not yet at the scale and depth needed for systemic resilience.

• Ministries:

  • commission studies and collect data,

  • but do not consistently embed evidence, evaluation and experimentation into the policy cycle.

G3. Impact on actionability

• There is no robust shared factual baseline:

  • different groups live in different information worlds,

  • making consensus on “what is happening” and “what must be done” harder.

• Reforms are easily framed as conspiracies, sell-outs, or plots.

• Policy-making is often narrative-driven, not evidence-driven:

  • ad-hoc use of research,

  • limited systematic learning from evaluation,

  • weak institutional links between science and government.

G4. System linkages

• G undermines:

  • F (politics): trust and voice get distorted via information manipulation.

  • A (strategy): missions are hard to justify and maintain publicly.

  • E & B (integrity and culture): disinformation weaponises any misstep, increasing fear and risk-aversion.

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The Areas of Malfunction

A1. Fragmented whole-of-government coordination

What this means in practice

At the top level, Czechia doesn’t really behave like one state system; it behaves like a federation of ministries and agencies:

• Each ministry largely runs its own strategies, projects, IT systems and EU-fund programmes.

• The Office of the Government (Úřad vlády) has limited tools to force genuine joint action on cross-cutting issues (digital state, housing, climate, AI, demographic change).

• The OECD governance review explicitly notes that coordination across ministries is weak and that core centre-of-government functions for planning and policy coordination need strengthening. OECD+1

On top of this horizontal fragmentation at central level, you have extreme territorial fragmentation:

• Over 6,000 municipalities, 88% with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, the smallest on average in the OECD. This makes coordination and coherent implementation across the territory very difficult and creates big capacity gaps at local level. OECD+1

So fragmentation is both horizontal (between ministries) and vertical (between centre, regions, thousands of small municipalities).

How it looks concretely in the Czech state

You can see the consequences in concrete audits and reports:

• The Supreme Audit Office (NKÚ) looked at the “Smart Administration” strategy – a flagship attempt to modernise public administration and e-government. Their verdict: the goals to improve efficiency weren’t met because of insufficient coordination between responsible bodies, and the state made errors worth hundreds of millions of CZK. nku.cz+1

• OECD notes that Czechia has produced many strategies and programmes (for public administration reform, digitalisation, SDGs, etc.), but the horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms to implement them are weak or fragmented. OECD+2Google Books+2

In other words: you don’t just have “lots of documents”; you have lots of uncoordinated documents, implemented through unaligned silos.

Why this is critical for actionability

Fragmentation kills actionability in at least five ways:

1. Cross-cutting reforms stall or collapse
   Anything that touches more than one ministry or level of government becomes a negotiation swamp:

   • housing and spatial planning (regional development + environment + transport + finance),

   • energy transition (industry + environment + finance + regional development),

   • digital state (interior + justice + finance + sectoral ministries).
     You can write a strategy, but you cannot push the system through the bottlenecks.

2. Contradictory policies and signals
   Without a strong coordination mechanism, ministries produce measures that:

   • pull sectors in different directions,

   • duplicate efforts (e.g. parallel IT projects, overlapping programmes),

   • or neutralise each other (one ministry subsidises something another is trying to regulate).
     For businesses, municipalities and citizens this shows up as noise and uncertainty, not coherent direction.

3. EU funds and investments are under-optimised
   When each ministry and region designs projects in its own silo, EU funds are scattered across small, disconnected initiatives instead of being concentrated into a few joint, systemic upgrades (e.g. one unified digital backbone, one integrated housing-transport plan for major agglomerations).
   OECD and NKÚ repeatedly point to inefficiencies in managing investment and structural funds linked to weak coordination. OECD+2OECD+2

4. Local implementation is inconsistent and slow
   With thousands of municipalities of very different capacity, every nationally announced priority (e.g. “speed up building permits”, “improve energy efficiency of housing”, “modernise schools”) hits a fragmented implementation field.
   OECD explicitly says that this fragmentation and capacity gap undermines the efficiency of public services and investment. OECD+1

5. Nobody can be held truly responsible for outcomes
   When a cross-cutting policy fails, each actor can say: “We did our part; others didn’t.”
   That turns coordination failures into perfect alibis, which directly erodes the capacity of the government to learn from mistakes and act differently next time.

Net effect on the Czech state’s ability to move in a positive direction

• It becomes very hard to pick big, structural priorities and actually deliver them.

• The state instead produces many small, fragmented changes that do not add up to visible transformation.

• For citizens, this looks like: “We’ve been talking about the same reforms for 15 years, nothing fundamental changes.”

• For you (and anyone trying to design reforms), fragmentation is the first meta-problem: unless it’s reduced or bypassed, every other solution gets eaten by the silos.

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A2. Weak centre-of-government strategic steering

What this means in practice

The “centre of government” (Prime Minister’s Office, Office of the Government, linked advisory and coordination units) is the place that should:

• articulate a small set of national priorities,

• align ministry strategies and budgets with them,

• and monitor whether those priorities are delivered.

In Czechia, the centre’s strategic steering function has been repeatedly weakened, rebuilt and re-shuffled:

• The Government Office used to host a strategic planning team and sustainable development unit coordinating Czech Republic 2030 and SDGs.

• That sustainable development agenda (unit + Government Council for Sustainable Development) was moved to the Ministry of Environment in 2018, which OECD and UN reviews interpret as a sign that SDGs weren’t treated as a top-level, cross-government strategic issue. cr2030.cz+2Sustainable Development Platform+2

• The strategic planning team at the Government Office was abolished, weakening coordination and strategic planning capacities across the government. sgi-network.org+1

• In 2023 a Government Analytical Unit was set up to rebuild some of this capacity, but it is still new and its role is evolving. sgi-network.org+1

So the centre has oscillated between being a real brain of the government and being mostly a secretariat organising meetings and paperwork.

How it looks concretely in the Czech state

1. Strategy overload, no clear steering “spine”
   OECD notes that Czechia has a large number of strategies at national, sectoral and regional levels, but their mutual coherence and link to the central Strategic Framework Czech Republic 2030 is weak. OECD+2cr2030.cz+2

   • CR 2030 was updated in 2024 and does address governance issues, but the report on quality of life and sustainability states that systematic monitoring of long-term impacts is not taking place, and strategic work “is not improving” despite the existence of CR 2030. cr2030.cz+1

2. Centre reacting more than steering
   Multiple reviews (OECD governance review, evidence-informed policymaking report) emphasise that:

   • the Government Office tends to react to ministry proposals rather than drive coherent cross-government initiatives,

   • central analytical capacity is still modest compared to the complexity of tasks. OECD+2vlada.gov.cz+2

3. Weak links between priorities, budget and EU funds
   Strategy and budget are not tightly integrated:

   • Medium-term expenditure frameworks exist, but are not consistently used to lock-in multi-year strategic priorities;

   • EU funds are often programmed primarily at sectoral/operational level rather than as instruments for a small number of cross-government missions. OECD+2Google Books+2

Why this is critical for actionability

Without strong strategic steering at the centre:

1. There is no “north star” for the system
   Ministries, regions, agencies, state-owned companies and universities don’t have a clear, shared sense of:

   • these are the 5–7 things the country must achieve in the next 10–15 years,

   • everyone must show how their work contributes to these, not to their own local agendas.

   Result: good local initiatives, but weak cumulative direction.

2. Budgets don’t enforce priorities
   If the Government Programme, CR 2030, and other strategies aren’t strongly linked to how money is allocated:

   • low-priority projects can be funded because they fit silo logics or local lobbying,

   • high-priority missions (e.g. digital state, ageing population, energy transition) may remain underfunded or fragmented.
     This is the opposite of “actionability”: the system’s real steering instrument (money) is not used to implement its declared strategy.

3. No disciplined follow-through on reforms
   With a weak centre, once Parliament passes a law or adopts a strategy, no one systematically checks:

   • Are milestones being met?

   • Which ministry or region is stuck?

   • Do we need to change legislation, funding or responsibilities?
     Without this, reforms are like “fire and forget”; implementation quality becomes a lottery.

4. Easier capture by sectoral and private interests
   If there is no strong central filter that checks proposals for their strategic fit and systemic effects, ministries are more exposed to:

   • sectoral pressures,

   • short-term business lobbying,

   • internal bureaucratic comfort.
     This doesn’t always mean “corruption”; it means no one is strongly defending the system-level public interest.

5. Public and external partners see inconsistency
   OECD, EU institutions, investors, universities, NGOs: they see a country with many plans but not a clearly articulated, stable, centre-driven trajectory.
   That affects:

   • trust in long-term commitments,

   • interest in co-investing in long-horizon projects,

   • and the willingness of domestic actors to mobilise behind government agendas.

Net effect on the Czech state’s ability to move forward

• The state rarely behaves like a strategic actor; it behaves like an administrator that occasionally launches “projects” and “concepts”.

• When you try to design serious reforms (education, housing, AI-driven productivity, climate adaptation), you don’t have a strong central partner that can:

  • aggregate evidence,

  • broker trade-offs,

  • protect the reform across political cycles.

• This is why so many complex reforms start but don’t land: the steering cockpit is underpowered.

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A3. Lack of stable high-level reform leadership

What this means in practice

Structural reforms in any country (justice, public administration, pensions, health, territorial reform, digital state) take 10+ years to design, negotiate, implement, adjust and embed.

In Czechia, reform leadership is:

• heavily personalised (tied to individual ministers or coalitions),

• vulnerable to electoral cycles and coalition shifts,

• and weakly institutionalised.

You can see this pattern across different sectors:

• Public administration reform “Client-oriented Public Administration 2030” exists, but even its own strategic framework admits that, despite multiple reforms and many strategic documents, key problems of public administration persist. mv.gov.cz+2mv.gov.cz+2

• The building act (stavební zákon) reform is a textbook case:

  • after years of criticism about extremely slow permitting, a major new act was adopted,

  • then its implementation was postponed and reopened for debate by the next government,

  • professional organisations criticised the amendments as proof that the government is unable to enforce a real, coherent reform of building law. Expats.cz+3Archiweb+3Schoenherr+3

• Digitalisation of building permits (core to both housing and digital state) is again delayed, with a 2025 NKÚ draft audit noting that delays began even before the current government took office, showing a longer-term pattern of under-managed reform. Radio Prague

What “lack of stable reform leadership” really implies

It doesn’t mean “no one wants reforms”; Czech governments constantly announce reforms.

It means:

• There is no permanent institutional engine at the centre that owns big reforms as multi-term programmes.

• When ministers change or coalitions shift, reforms are:

  • renamed,

  • partially reversed,

  • or simply deprioritised without a clear decision.

This makes rational behaviour inside the system:

“Wait this out, it will change again.”

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Big reforms never reach the “boring middle”
   The hardest part of reform is not adoption, but:

   • aligning IT systems,

   • re-training thousands of staff,

   • changing processes in every municipality, court or hospital.
     Without stable leadership, reforms stay in the “symbolic front” (laws and PR) and die in the boring middle.

2. Civil servants and local governments stop believing in promises
   If they’ve seen 3–4 cycles of “this time we really reform X”, their rational stance is:

   • implement the minimal visible part,

   • avoid major changes that cost political capital locally,

   • assume that the next government will change the rules again.
     This massively reduces the energy and risk-taking in the system.

3. Knowledge and learning are continuously lost
   Each reform creates:

   • analyses,

   • pilot projects,

   • lessons on what worked and what failed.
     When reform teams are dissolved and agendas reshuffled, this knowledge is not institutionalised; the next wave starts from near zero.

4. External actors don’t commit deeply
   Companies, universities, NGOs and donors will not invest heavily into co-creating reforms if they think:

   • the whole direction may be reversed in 2–3 years,

   • commitments are bound to particular ministers, not to a multi-term state policy.
     That means less co-invested transformation, more short-term, project-based cooperation.

5. It feeds the narrative that “reform is impossible”
   After enough failed or partial attempts, people internalise the belief that the system cannot change at depth.
   That belief itself becomes a powerful inhibitor: it shrinks political imagination and makes incrementalism the default.

Net effect on the Czech state’s ability to move forward

• The state can declare almost any reform; it struggles to finish any complex reform.

• This severely limits the country’s ability to:

  • upgrade its institutional infrastructure (justice, state capacity, territorial organisation),

  • react to long-term challenges (ageing, climate, AI),

  • and fully leverage periods of economic strength for deep transformation.

• In practice, it keeps Czechia in a “middle-trap” of governance: good enough to function, not good enough to truly accelerate.

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A4. Short-termism and policy instability

What this means in practice

The political and administrative system is heavily oriented to the four-year electoral cycle and short media horizons.

Even when long-term strategies exist (CR 2030, sectoral concepts), they are:

• weakly linked to binding mechanisms (budget frameworks, legal rules, independent institutions),

• and easily overridden by short-term political pressures.

OECD economic surveys point out that Czechia faces big long-run challenges (ageing, stalled productivity, climate transition) that require long-lasting reforms, but progress has been slow and incomplete. spcr.cz+1

The independent Report on Quality of Life and its Sustainability states bluntly:

• systematic monitoring of long-term impacts is not happening,

• strategic work in public administration has not improved since CR 2030 was adopted, and in some respects has deteriorated. cr2030.cz+1

So Czechia has long-term documents, but the everyday operating logic is fundamentally short-term.

How short-termism shows up

1. Frequent changes and reversals of key laws and policies
   The building act is again a clear example: major reforms adopted, then postponed, re-opened, partially reversed. Dostupný advokát+3Archiweb+3CEE Legal Matters+3
   Similar patterns appear in:

   • digitalisation projects (e.g. delayed digital building permits), Radio Prague

   • attempts to reform territorial governance and public administration (multiple framework documents, limited continuity). mv.gov.cz+1

2. Budget and investment planning still dominated by annual logic
   Medium-term frameworks exist on paper, but:

   • multi-annual, cross-party commitments around big reforms (pensions, health, education, AI) are limited,

   • major infrastructure and transformation projects often face shifting political priorities and funding.

3. Institutional churn
   Functions (like sustainable development coordination) move between the Government Office and ministries; strategic units are created and abolished; councils come and go. cr2030.cz+2Sustainable Development Platform+2
   That makes it difficult for any institutional structure to accumulate long-term authority and know-how.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Long-horizon investments become risky
   If you are a municipality, a region, a company or a university, and you see frequent reversals in key frameworks:

   • you hesitate to invest in projects that require 10+ years of stable rules,

   • you under-invest in capabilities specifically tailored to current reforms,

   • you prefer safe, incremental, reversible actions.
     This translates into lost compound growth in human capital, infrastructure and innovation.

2. The state cannot credibly commit
   For big reforms (e.g. pensions, energy transition, AI regulation), what matters is not only what is decided, but whether the state can credibly commit to sustain the direction for 10–20 years.
   Short-termism and instability destroy that credibility.

3. Every new government re-opens solved problems
   Instead of building on previous reforms (fixing bugs, strengthening positives), new governments are tempted to:

   • symbolically distance themselves from predecessors,

   • rebrand or undo their reforms,

   • use legislative changes to send partisan signals.
     The result is a stop-go pattern that wastes political and administrative energy.

4. Long-term risks remain under-governed
   Problems like:

   • demographic ageing,

   • climate adaptation,

   • digital transformation and AI governance,

   • structural competitiveness
     require decades-long evolution of systems (taxes, education, regulation, R&D).
     Short-termism ensures these are always under-addressed relative to their importance; crises then hit harder and reactive measures are more expensive.

5. It corrodes trust and reform appetite
   Citizens see:

   • constant changes in rules,

   • frequent political battles over the same issues,

   • little sense of stable direction.
     This feeds cynicism: “They always promise, they never finish. Why should we believe the next plan?”
     Low trust, in turn, makes it harder to mobilise support for genuinely necessary, but painful reforms.

Net effect on the Czech state’s ability to move forward

• Short-termism is like a gravity field pulling every initiative back to the electoral cycle.

• It ensures that:

  • big reforms remain politically dangerous and administratively exhausting,

  • actors hedge instead of committing,

  • and the default mode of the state is reactive management rather than proactive transformation.

Combined with fragmentation, weak central steering and unstable reform leadership, it creates the meta-pattern you’re concerned about:

The Czech state is capable of running day-to-day administration, but structurally weak at moving the country to a fundamentally better trajectory.

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B1. Formalistic compliance over outcomes

What this means

This is the pattern where the administration:

• obsesses over procedures, documents, and formal rules,

• but pays much less attention to whether the policy actually works in reality.

Success = “all forms were correct, rules were followed, we spent the money” –
not “people’s lives improved; systems now function better”.

This is deeply embedded in Czech administrative and legal culture (the whole tradition of “hlavně, aby to sedělo papírově”).

How it shows up in the Czech state

You can see this pattern in several recurring findings:

1. EU funds and subsidy programmes focused on form, not impact

   • The Supreme Audit Office (NKÚ) repeatedly finds that EU-funded programmes are designed with non-specific and non-measurable objectives, making it impossible to assess whether the money actually delivered the intended benefits. nku.cz+1

   • A 2020–2021 NKÚ summary of EU funds audits identified 354 audit findings with deficiencies totalling CZK 15.5 billion; many were not “outright fraud” but poorly defined objectives, weak control systems and formalistic programme design. nku.cz

2. Digitalisation: rules, projects – but disappointing real-world effects

   • NKÚ’s 2022 Annual Report states bluntly that digitalisation of public administration has been progressing very slowly and is not delivering the expected results, and that deficiencies in digitalisation and inter-ministerial communication were a main reason for the poor performance during COVID-19. nku.cz

   • On paper, digitalisation strategies and “eGovernment projects” exist; in practice, users often experience fragmented services, multiple logins and paper requirements behind the digital front-end.

3. Programmes where billions were spent, but real outcomes barely changed

   • NKÚ’s 2024 audit on social inclusion spending concluded that billions of crowns used between 2020–2022 produced only limited results in improving the situation of excluded localities; the Labour Ministry rejected the criticism, but the pattern is clear: large formal programmes, weak measurable impact. romea.cz+1

4. Audits where formal non-compliance is documented, but systemic issues remain

   • NKÚ’s strategy 2023–2027 highlights that many of the same systemic issues (weak internal controls, unclear objectives, poor programme design) appear again and again across different audits and years. nku.cz+1

   • That’s classic formalism: institutions correct narrow formal errors, but the underlying design problems and outcome gaps remain untouched.

Why this kills actionability

1. It shifts energy from solving problems to covering backs
   Civil servants spend a huge share of their time on:

   • ensuring documentation is complete,

   • checking procedural details for audits,

   • designing rules to be “audit-proof”.
     That leaves less energy for diagnosing real problems, co-designing solutions with users, and iteratively improving policies.

2. Nobody is rewarded for outcomes – only for compliance

   • If you strictly follow the rules and your programme fails in reality, you are safe.

   • If you bend or simplify rules to actually solve problems, you are vulnerable.
     Over time this creates a culture where initiative and experimentation are irrational behaviours.

3. Policies are designed to satisfy lawyers and auditors, not citizens

   • Objectives are written in vague, generic language to keep flexibility and avoid being “caught failing” on specific metrics.

   • Processes are optimised to tick EU and national compliance requirements, not to be simple, fast and effective for municipalities, businesses or households.

4. Learning is blocked
   If success/failure is not measured in outcomes, the system cannot learn what works:

   • There is no strong feedback loop from reality into programme design.

   • Even when NKÚ or evaluations point to poor impact, the response often focuses on fine-tuning procedures rather than redesigning the intervention.

5. It reinforces distrust
   Citizens and businesses see complex procedures, unclear practical benefits and repeated news that “billions were spent, results are limited”. That reinforces the belief that:

“The state cares about paperwork, not about real life.”
Low trust then reduces willingness to cooperate with state initiatives, making future policy implementation even harder.

Net effect on the ability to move the country forward

• The state can implement formal programmes and distribute money;

• it struggles to convert that money into real, visible, measurable improvements in housing, education, health, regional development, etc.

• Every ambitious initiative risks drowning in formalism unless you explicitly redesign rules, incentives and measurement around outcomes and learning, not just compliance.

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B2. Risk-aversion & fear of responsibility (“úřednická opatrnost”)

What this means

Here we’re talking about a pervasive pattern where civil servants and politicians:

• avoid decisions that might be contested,

• hide behind procedures and collective bodies,

• and prefer inaction or delay over taking a risk and then being blamed.

This is partly a rational response to:

• complex laws and regulations,

• strong ex-post control (NKÚ, prosecutors, media) focused on mistakes,

• and weak positive incentives for successful, bold action.

How it shows up in the Czech state

It’s harder to measure culture than procedures, but several indicators point to a risk-averse environment:

1. Repeated NKÚ findings that “long-standing problems remain unresolved”

   • In 2024, NKÚ published a summary of eight audits focused on internal state security, concluding that many problems had been identified earlier but remain unresolved, and calling for systemic changes. nku.cz+1

   • Similarly, NKÚ reports about EU funds and public investments repeatedly highlight that weaknesses identified in earlier audits keep reappearing. nku.cz+1

   • This suggests that once a problem is known, institutions still hesitate to change structures and processes in a deeper way.

2. Digitalisation and building permits as emblematic cases

   • NKÚ’s 2022 Annual Report states that slow and fragmented digitalisation contributed to poor performance in COVID-19; despite this, progress in joining up systems and simplifying processes remains slow. nku.cz+1

   • The reform of building law (stavební zákon) has seen repeated postponements, partial reversals and delays in implementing digital building permits, even as everyone recognises that extremely slow permitting is a major bottleneck for housing and infrastructure.

3. Legal and audit environment that punishes mistakes more than it rewards initiative

   • The Czech legal framework and audit practice give NKÚ, prosecutors and other bodies significant power to scrutinise decisions ex post; this is crucial for integrity, but the combination of:

     • complex, sometimes ambiguous laws, and

     • strong sanctioning potential,
       tends to push officials towards extreme caution.

   • Academic and expert commentary on Czech public administration often emphasises “úřednická opatrnost” as a central behavioural trait in decision-making, especially around public procurement, large projects, and anything that deviates from precedent. download.upce.cz+2Transparency International+2

Why this kills actionability

1. Preference for procedural safety over substantive progress
   When people are afraid of being blamed, the rational choice is:

   • apply the strictest, safest interpretation of rules,

   • ask for more opinions, more approvals, more “rounds”,

   • or delay decisions until “conditions are clearer”.
     That slows down every project and reform.

2. Innovations die in the early stages
   Any change that deviates from the status quo:

   • new digital service,

   • new funding model,

   • new way of cooperating with municipalities or NGOs
     carries some legal and reputational risk. Without a culture and framework that explicitly protects responsible experimentation, most ideas are killed or watered down.

3. Nobody takes ownership of difficult trade-offs
   Many crucial reforms require decisions that will upset someone (e.g. redistributing resources, closing inefficient programmes, reforming subsidies).
   Risk-averse actors prefer:

   • to postpone,

   • to launch “further analyses”,

   • or to fragment the reform into small pieces so that no one decision is clearly visible.
     This leads to timid, incoherent reforms that don’t change the system.

4. It strengthens informal power structures
   When formal actors are paralysed by fear, decisions move to:

   • informal networks,

   • opaque bargaining,

   • or “shadow vetoes” by those who can block but never formally decide.
     That undermines accountability and makes coordinated, transparent change even harder.

5. Talent drains away from public service
   Ambitious, problem-solving people don’t enjoy an environment where:

   • initiative is punished,

   • risk-taking is irrational,

   • and the safest career strategy is to never stick your neck out.
     Over time, this shrinks the pool of people inside the state who want to drive change.

Net effect on the ability to move the country forward

• The state knows many of its problems (NKÚ, OECD, CR2030 reports all describe them very clearly). OECD+2ČR2030+2

• But risk-aversion means it struggles to act on that knowledge when action implies visible risk.

• This is one of the core reasons why Czechia ends up in a pattern of diagnosed but untreated problems – the insights exist, but the system is wired to avoid decisive moves.

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B3. Systemic alibism – nobody really owns outcomes

What this means

“Systemic alibism” is the situation where:

• every actor has a plausible alibi for failure,

• responsibilities are fragmented and blurred,

• and when something doesn’t work, everyone can point to someone else:

“We followed the rules; it was another ministry/region/agency that failed.”

It’s the combination of:

• fragmented responsibilities,

• weak performance management,

• limited consequences for non-delivery,

• and strong focus on formal compliance.

How it shows up in the Czech state

1. Repeated, cross-sector audits showing unresolved systemic issues

   • NKÚ’s audits across many sectors (internal security, transport, EU funds, social inclusion, digitalisation) often highlight long-standing problems that remain unresolved despite earlier warnings. nku.gov.cz+3nku.cz+3nku.cz+3

   • NKÚ’s strategy 2023–2027 explicitly frames its mission as pushing for systemic reforms because current management and control systems aren’t addressing root causes. nku.cz+1

   • When the same problem appears in audits years apart, it usually means: everyone had an alibi, no one had enough responsibility + power + pressure to fix it.

2. Complex multi-level governance without strong accountability links

   • The OECD review describes Czechia’s multi-level governance as complex and fragmented, with many small municipalities and unclear or weak mechanisms to coordinate and hold actors accountable for service quality and investment outcomes. OECD+1

   • In such an environment, poor results can always be attributed to “lack of capacity at local level”, “unclear competences”, or “insufficient funding from the centre” – all partially true, but together they form a perfect accountability fog.

3. Strategies and reforms without strong performance regimes

   • Client-oriented Public Administration 2030, CR 2030, sectoral strategies – they exist, but even official assessments admit that systematic monitoring of long-term impacts is not taking place and that strategic work is not improving. ČR2030

   • Without clear owners, targets, and consequences, these strategies become collective alibis: “we adopted a strategy, so we’re doing something”.

4. No consistent practice of naming and addressing failure

   • NKÚ and some NGOs or media highlight failures, but there is no strong institutionalised practice of:

     • public performance dashboards,

     • peer comparison between ministries/regions,

     • structured follow-up where someone is clearly told: “this is your responsibility to fix, and we will check again in X months”.

   • That allows alibis to persist: “conditions were not favourable”, “European rules changed”, “previous government created the problem”, etc.

Why this kills actionability

1. If nobody is truly responsible, nobody truly fights for success

   • Responsibility is not just about blame; it is also about ownership and motivation.

   • If you know that even a big failure will be attributed to “the system”, why would you spend political capital and personal energy to fix it?

2. Feedback from audits and evidence is weakly connected to change

   • NKÚ and OECD provide high-quality diagnoses. But if each institution can say “we were only one of many actors”, their recommendations diffuse into the system without a clear implementer.

   • That’s a classic “tragedy of the commons” – everyone benefits from reform, but no single actor is clearly responsible for driving it.

3. It encourages symbolic action instead of substantive reform

   • When accountability is weak, it’s rational to:

     • adopt new strategies,

     • create councils and working groups,

     • issue new guidelines –
       because these look like action but don’t expose anyone to concrete accountability for outcomes.

   • Real reforms (with measurable results) are avoided because they would make failure visible and attributable.

4. Citizens see a lot of talk and little follow-through

   • Over time, people learn that:

     • reports are written,

     • conferences are held,

     • new programmes are announced –
       but their daily experience doesn’t change much.

   • This erodes trust and makes it harder to mobilise support for future reforms, even if they are well-designed.

5. It blocks coalition-building for change

   • To move a country in a positive direction, you need coalitions: ministries, regions, municipalities, businesses, NGOs.

   • But coalition-building only works if at least one actor has strong ownership, and others can trust that they will stick with the effort.

   • Systemic alibism makes every coalition fragile because everyone suspects that, in the end, the blame will be shifted to them while others escape.

Net effect on the ability to move the country forward

• Systemic alibism is like the operating system of the dysfunction:

  • it allows fragmentation, weak steering and risk-aversion to continue indefinitely,

  • it neutralises critical audits and analyses,

  • and it ensures that even well-known problems survive political cycles.

• Until you build clear lines of outcome responsibility – with data, transparency and meaningful consequences – many other reforms will slide off the surface of the system.

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C1. Patronage & politicisation of the civil service

What the problem is (short version)

Formal rules say “merit-based professional service”, but in practice top layers of the bureaucracy are still significantly politicised, and informal networks matter a lot. This undermines neutrality, continuity and the capacity to implement long-term reforms.

How it looks in Czechia right now

• The 2014 Civil Service Act (effective 2015) was supposed to depoliticise the bureaucracy by separating political and administrative posts and establishing merit-based recruitment, with the Civil Service Section at the Ministry of Interior as a central gatekeeper.Paradigm+1

• Research on top civil servants shows that political influence is still strong in senior appointments: top posts are often filled with people linked to party structures or ministers, and governments can use re-organisations to effectively replace senior officials.Paradigm

• Comparative work puts Czechia at a “medium” level of politicisation: less politicised than Poland or Hungary, but still clearly politicised at the top when compared to older Western democracies.Paradigm+1

• Ordinary officials perceive lower levels of direct intervention in their day-to-day work, but promotions and top managerial positions are still seen as politically influenced.Paradigm

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Short time horizon & policy flip-flops
   When senior officials are replaced after each election or coalition change, institutional memory disappears. Complex reforms (justice, healthcare, digitalisation, education) need 8–15 years of consistent implementation. A politicised top layer incentivises:

   • focusing on visible, short-term moves (press conferences, announcements)

   • avoiding structural, conflict-heavy changes that outlive the current minister

2. Self-censorship and risk avoidance
   If your promotion depends on political loyalty rather than performance, you don’t push uncomfortable truths upward. You under-report risks, avoid saying “this policy design will fail”, and learn to “survive” rather than to optimise. That kills honest feedback loops.

3. Low trust in expertise
   Politicised appointments send a message to professionals inside and outside the state:
   “It doesn’t really matter how good you are; what matters is who you know.”
   That reduces the ability to attract top experts from academia, NGOs, or the private sector – and you end up with average staff trying to execute above-average complexity.

4. Fragmentation of the apparatus
   Each political party builds its “own people” inside ministries, agencies and state-owned companies. That leads to:

   • parallel informal chains of command

   • low willingness to share information across party “fiefdoms”

   • weak cross-ministerial coalitions for reforms

5. Public trust spiral
   OECD notes that trust in government and in the civil service in Czechia is significantly below the OECD average.OECD+1
   Citizens feel that “nothing changes anyway” because reforms are seen as party games, not as expert-driven efforts. Low trust reduces political space for ambitious, long-term measures.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Reduces the chance of technocratic, cross-party projects (e.g. long-term pension reform, climate transition, AI & industrial policy) because each new coalition wants its own people and its own “branding” instead of finishing what was started.

• Makes the system fragile in crises: you cannot rely on stable, experienced teams when there is a pandemic, war, or energy shock; you improvise with semi-new people and fragmented networks.

• Lowers the probability that evidence-based policymaking (impact assessments, evaluations) will be taken seriously, because evidence is filtered through political loyalty.

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C2. Demotivating pay and career structures

What the problem is (short version)

Pay and careers in Czech public administration are rigid, seniority-based, poorly differentiated by performance, and often uncompetitive for key expert roles. This drives talent away and weakens the competence of the apparatus exactly where it needs to be strongest.

How it looks in Czechia right now

• In public administration, salary scales are still strongly tied to seniority. The Civil Service Act uses years of service plus job classification to determine pay, with performance playing a secondary role.OECD+1

• OECD explicitly recommends reviewing seniority-based pay in Czechia, warning that linking salary primarily to years of service can be inefficient and demotivating.OECD

• Government employment is about 17.3 % of total employment, slightly below the OECD average (18.6 %), so the state is not excessively “bloated” in headcount; the issue is more about who is employed and how they are rewarded, not just how many.OECD

• The Client-Oriented Public Administration 2030 strategy and the OECD governance review both highlight that the Czech administration must improve its ability to attract and retain people with the right skills, and that this requires updating recruitment and people-management principles.OECD+1

Why this is critical for actionability

1. You can’t buy the skills you need
   For digitalisation, AI, advanced regulation, strategic planning, cybersecurity, and complex infrastructure, the state is competing with private employers. Rigid salary tables and limited bonuses mean:

   • genuinely top people often refuse to join

   • those who join may leave quickly once they gain some experience

2. Wrong incentives inside the system

   Seniority-heavy pay structures reward:

   • staying long and avoiding mistakes

   • not rocking the boat
     far more than:

   • taking initiative

   • designing and implementing complex reforms

   • learning new skills

3. Performance signals are weak

   When performance evaluations only marginally affect pay, promotions, or access to attractive assignments, the system doesn’t clearly distinguish between:

   • people who merely “hold the chair”

   • and those who drive real change

   This leads to mediocrity as the equilibrium.

4. Internal brain drain to agencies and projects

   Talented civil servants often escape into special projects, EU-funded units, or state-owned companies where pay and flexibility can be better. That drains capacity from the core centre of government and line ministries, which are precisely where strategic reforms should be led.

5. Inability to scale “islands of excellence”

   OECD notes “islands of good practice” across the Czech administration, but they remain islands.OECD
   Without career systems and incentives that reward excellence and spread it horizontally, good teams stay isolated and their methods do not become the standard.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Limits the ambition level: if you know that your ministry cannot recruit a modern data/AI team or world-class policy analysts, you design smaller, incremental projects and avoid big, strategic bets.

• Slows down implementation: even when the political system agrees on a reform (e.g. public administration digitalisation, education strategy 2030+), execution is hampered by a lack of project management, UX, IT, and change-management skills.

• Undermines long-term continuity: good people leave, bad structures stay. Every wave of enthusiasm (e.g. around a new strategy or EU funds) dissipates because the underlying HR system pulls things back toward average.

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C3. Outdated HR management, evaluation & development

What the problem is (short version)

HR in the Czech state operates largely as an administrative/ legal function, not as a strategic talent and capability function. Recruitment, evaluation, training and mobility are fragmented, paper-heavy and often reactive rather than proactive.

How it looks in Czechia right now

• The central HR framework is set by the Civil Service Act, but many processes remain decentralised and strongly formalistic; recruitment is centralised for approvals, while other HR processes vary widely across offices.European Commission

• The OECD Public Governance Review explicitly calls for:

  • updating recruitment and people-management principles, especially for senior leaders

  • a more strategic approach to learning and development

  • and much better use of HR data and analytics for workforce planning.OECD

• The Ministry of Interior has issued a Methodological Guideline for Quality Management in Public Service Offices (Metodický pokyn pro řízení kvality), but its implementation is uneven and many offices lack the capacity and culture to use quality management tools seriously.Czech Interior Ministry+1

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Recruitment is slow, formalistic, and not mission-driven

   Job announcements are often generic, written in bureaucratic language, and do not sell the mission or the impact of the role. HR focuses on checking formal criteria (degrees, years of service) instead of:

   • assessing problem-solving, strategic thinking, collaboration

   • hiring for modern skills (data, digital, stakeholder engagement, behavioural insights)

2. Weak performance management

   Even though the law allows for performance evaluation, in practice the quality of evaluations is very uneven. In many offices, assessments are perfunctory, not tied to clear KPIs or behavioural expectations, and not linked strongly to:

   • promotions

   • pay

   • access to development opportunities

   That makes it almost impossible to build a performance culture.

3. Training without a capability strategy

   Reports on training show many individual courses, but there is often no coherent capability map:

   • What skills do we need to implement digital government?

   • Which competencies are critical at the centre of government for evidence-informed policy?

   • How do we re-skill mid-career officials for data-driven work?

   Without these answers, training is fragmented and rarely aligned with national priorities.ČR2030+1

4. Limited internal mobility and talent pipelines

   Internal mobility can be a key mechanism for building whole-of-government capacity, but in Czechia it is under-used. OECD suggests public administrations should use mobility to pool human resources across government and retain talent; Czechia is only partially using this lever.OECD+1

   As a result:

   • talented officials get “stuck” in one desk for years

   • cross-ministerial project teams are hard to build

   • there is no systematic pipeline for future DGs, state secretaries, or chief specialists

5. Poor data to steer reforms

   The system does not yet systematically use:

   • HR analytics to predict retirements, skill gaps, or critical positions at risk

   • dashboards for leadership to see the real human-capital situation

   OECD explicitly flags barriers to HR analytics and calls for more data-driven workforce management.OECD+1

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Makes the state slow and clumsy: every new strategic initiative (AI strategy, health transformation, climate transition, education reform) struggles to find people with the right mix of skills inside the administration.

• Prevents building mission-driven teams: you can’t quickly assemble a cross-cutting “tiger team” that cuts across ministries and works on one strategic priority with the right talent mix.

• Reduces adaptability: when the environment changes (COVID, Ukraine war, energy crisis), HR systems cannot rapidly reallocate talent or import new skills; the administration responds with ad-hoc fixes, not structural reconfiguration.

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D1 – Extreme territorial fragmentation

What this is

Czechia has one of the most fragmented systems of local government in the OECD:

• Around 6 258 municipalities and 4 military districts. Statistika

• Average municipal size: about 1 710 inhabitants, the smallest among OECD countries (OECD average ~10 250, EU average ~5 960). sng-wofi.org

• Each municipality has its own authority – over 6 200 local governments in total. springerprofessional.de+1

This explosion of municipalities was enabled by early-1990s legislation allowing villages to split off; unlike many OECD countries, Czechia has not done any substantial amalgamation since. Only 21 mergers since 1993. Council of Europe+1

Why it matters

1. Structural inefficiency in service delivery
   Recent research (2025) on “Extreme Fragmentation of Local Government in Czechia” shows smaller municipalities face structural disadvantages in:

   • service provision,

   • financial health,

   • and regulatory compliance. ResearchGate+1

   OECD’s Economic Survey 2020 says directly:

“The Czech Republic suffers from a highly fragmented subnational government with the highest number of municipalities per head in the OECD. The resulting lack of capacity at the local level impacts the quality of public services and impedes the uptake of effective development projects.” OECD

1. Coordination nightmare
   When the central state wants to implement any national priority on the ground (housing, energy efficiency, school upgrades, climate adaptation, social inclusion), it must deal with thousands of units at very different capacity levels. That makes:

   • coherent programming very difficult,

   • monitoring impact heavy and expensive,

   • and national standards harder to enforce without becoming purely formalistic.

2. Unequal ability to benefit from national/EU programmes
   Small municipalities with weak administrative and analytical capacity:

   • struggle to apply for grants,

   • design good projects,

   • manage procurement and reporting.

   The result is a built-in bias towards larger, more capable cities and regions – fragmentation translates into de facto inequality of opportunities for residents.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Any big transformation (e.g. green renovation of building stock, modernisation of schools, digitalisation of local services) becomes logistically and administratively heavy; instead of a few hundred strong implementing entities, you have thousands of small ones.

• The centre is forced into lowest-common-denominator design: programmes must be simple enough for the weakest municipalities to manage formally, which limits sophistication and outcome-orientation.

• Strategic policies end up being implemented unevenly; some parts of the country move ahead, others lag behind. That undermines both fairness and the overall speed of transformation.

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D2 – Local capacity gaps & uneven service quality

What this is

Fragmentation itself wouldn’t be fatal if small municipalities were systematically supported by strong capacity-sharing arrangements. In practice, Czechia has uneven and often low administrative capacity at the local level:

• OECD notes significant regional variation in incomes and poverty and stresses that fragmentation and limited capacity “impede the effective provision of public services and investment.” OECD+1

• New research (2025) confirms that smaller municipalities in Czechia struggle especially with regulatory compliance, long-term planning and quality of services – unless they engage in inter-municipal cooperation. ResearchGate+1

How it shows up

1. Project and investment management
   Small municipalities often lack:

   • staff who can design and justify complex projects,

   • legal and procurement expertise,

   • capacity to manage multiple EU or national grants in parallel.

   This leads to:

   • under-utilisation of funds in weaker areas,

   • reliance on consultants who optimise for formal criteria, not local strategy,

   • higher risk of errors picked up by NKÚ and other controls.

2. Planning and regulation (especially land use, housing, environment)
   OECD analyses of land-use governance and housing in Czechia point to rigid spatial planning and uneven capacity across municipalities as barriers to affordable housing and efficient development. OECD+1

   Small municipalities may lack:

   • expertise in modern spatial planning,

   • capacity to integrate transport, environment and housing considerations,

   • ability to negotiate effectively with developers.

3. Use of evidence and data
   The OECD governance review notes that even at central level, evidence-informed policy is underdeveloped; at local level, the gaps are bigger. OECD+1

   Many municipalities operate without:

   • solid data on local needs,

   • analytical tools,

   • or capacity to evaluate what works.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. National strategies break on local reality
   A central ministry can design a sophisticated strategy (e.g. Education Strategy 2030+, social inclusion policies, energy transition), but implementation is only as strong as:

   • the school principals,

   • municipal social departments,

   • local planners and building offices.

   If these actors lack capacity, the strategy remains mostly on paper.

2. Path dependence and low ambition
   Municipalities with limited capacity tend to repeat known patterns:

   • copy old projects,

   • maintain old infrastructure,

   • avoid innovative approaches that require learning and risk.

   This locks large parts of the country into low-ambition trajectories even when funding exists for more transformative projects.

3. Growing territorial inequalities
   Regions and municipalities that do have capacity can move faster, attract investment, and deliver higher service quality. Others fall behind. Over time, this:

   • reinforces internal divides,

   • fuels perceptions of unfairness,

   • and complicates national cohesion around reforms.

Net effect on the ability to move the country forward

• The state’s overall “vector” is weakened by thousands of local bottlenecks.

• Even with political will and money at the centre, transformation is throttled by uneven local capabilities.

• In practice, this means that, for almost any reform you care about, you have to design massive support structures for municipalities – or accept that results will be patchy and slow.

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D3 – Dual system: state administration vs. self-government & unfunded mandates

What this is

Czechia has a relatively complex dual system:

• State administration (delegated powers)

• Territorial self-government (independent powers of municipalities and regions)

Municipalities and regions act both as self-governing bodies and as “local arms” of the state for delegated competences (přenesená působnost). Events Cloud+2Czech Interior Ministry+2

This is conceptually fine – many countries do this – but in Czechia the division of responsibilities and funding is often:

• complex,

• unclear,

• and contested (complaints about “unfunded mandates”).

How it shows up

1. Blurred accountability
   Because municipalities and regions perform both their own tasks and state-delegated tasks, it is often unclear who is politically and financially responsible when something doesn’t work:

   • Is it the ministry (for delegated powers)?

   • Is it the municipality (for how it organises its administration)?

   • Is it the region (for coordination)?

   This makes it easy to pass blame around instead of fixing structural issues.

2. Unfunded or under-funded mandates
   Local governments frequently argue that the central state:

   • assigns new responsibilities (e.g. in social services, building administration, crisis management, education administration),

   • without providing adequate financing.

   Academic and practitioner debates about “přenesená působnost” highlight tensions about fairness and sustainability of this model. Katedra Veřejných Financí+2OECD+2

3. Complex vertical coordination
   The OECD decentralisation paper on Czechia emphasises that the division of responsibilities between levels of government is complex, with overlapping competences and coordination challenges, and recommends clearer assignment and better multi-level governance frameworks. OECD

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Nobody fully owns implementation quality
   For many policies, the centre can say:

“We set the framework; municipalities must implement.”
Municipalities can say:
“We implement what you tell us; you don’t pay us enough or give us the tools.”

1. That’s a perfect recipe for systemic under-performance where everyone has a story and no one has real power+responsibility to fix the design.

2. Hard to redesign processes end-to-end
   Many important citizen journeys (building a house, getting social help, dealing with land-use, managing local transport) cut across:

   • state-delegated powers,

   • municipal self-government,

   • regional coordination.

   If competences and funding are fragmented, you can’t easily:

   • simplify the journey,

   • digitalise it end-to-end,

   • or assign a single owner responsible for the full experience.

3. Permanent friction zone
   The dual system becomes a permanent conflict theme instead of a productive partnership:

   • centre vs. municipalities on money and competences,

   • ministries vs. regions on who decides what.

   Energy that could go into joint reforms is spent on arguing about the rules of the game.

Net effect on the ability to move the country forward

• The state cannot easily build clean, strategic delivery chains from national vision to local reality.

• Every reform risks getting stuck in competence disputes and funding arguments.

• The dual system in its current form amplifies alibism: it provides built-in excuses on both sides, which directly undermines the country’s ability to move coherently toward long-term goals.

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D4 – Misaligned fiscal framework and incentives for local governments

What this is

The way municipalities and regions are financed – tax sharing, grants, co-financing rules – strongly shapes what they actually do. In Czechia:

• the fiscal framework only partially reflects differences in responsibilities and capacity,

• investment and grant systems often favour formal criteria over strategic impact,

• and there are weak incentives for cooperation and consolidation.

How it looks

1. Tax sharing vs. responsibilities
   Czech municipalities and regions receive resources through:

   • shared taxes (rozpočtové určení daní),

   • earmarked grants,

   • EU structural funds and other transfers.

   OECD and academic work point out tensions between who gets what and who is responsible for which services, contributing to debates about fairness and “unfunded mandates”. OECD+1

2. Project-based grants and EU funds
   The Czech system relies heavily on project-based funding from EU and national sources:

   • high administrative burden (applications, procurement, reporting),

   • unstable funding flows across programming periods,

   • strong focus on absorbing money vs. maximising impact.

   NKÚ repeatedly finds that programmes are designed with vague objectives and that billions are spent with limited measurable improvement – especially in areas like social inclusion or regional development. OECD+1

3. Weak incentives for inter-municipal cooperation
   Research on fragmentation notes that, while inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) can mitigate capacity problems, the fiscal and regulatory framework does not strongly push municipalities into durable, strategic cooperation structures. ResearchGate+1

   Often, cooperation is project-specific and time-limited, not a stable shared service model.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Local actors optimise for money flows, not outcomes
   When grants and EU programmes are complex and outcome-light, rational mayors and officials focus on:

   • “getting projects approved”,

   • making sure expenditures are formally eligible,

   • consuming envelopes before deadlines.

   That reinforces formalism and short-term project culture, rather than long-term, strategic investment.

2. Strategic priorities are not embedded in the fiscal system
   If the state wants to push big national missions (e.g. climate adaptation, digital government, housing affordability), it needs:

   • stable, multi-annual funding lines,

   • clear co-financing rules,

   • and incentives for local actors to align with those missions.

   The current mix of tax sharing and project grants only partially does this; much of local finance is path-dependent, not mission-aligned.

3. Poor municipalities remain trapped
   Municipalities with low tax bases and limited capacity:

   • struggle to co-finance ambitious projects,

   • have difficulty navigating complex calls,

   • and are more exposed to errors with financial consequences.

   That keeps them stuck in low-investment equilibria, even when national or EU funds could, in theory, help them leap forward.

4. Under-use of fiscal tools to shape behaviour
   OECD’s work on housing in Czechia notes that property taxation and land-based finance tools are under-used and rigid, limiting the ability to steer development patterns and fund infrastructure. OECD+1

   Similar issues exist in other domains: the fiscal system could be used much more aggressively to reward:

   • effective cooperation,

   • good planning,

   • measurable improvements in outcomes.

Net effect on the ability to move the country forward

• The fiscal architecture doesn’t naturally pull local actors towards national strategic goals; instead, it often pulls them towards short-term, grant-chasing behaviour.

• It doesn’t systematically reward municipalities and regions that:

  • cooperate deeply,

  • professionalise their administration,

  • and deliver visible improvements in quality of life.

• Without a re-engineered fiscal framework, many reforms will always feel like swimming against the current: the money flows and incentives keep dragging behaviour back to the old patterns.

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E1 – Limits of external audit & the internal control system

What this is

Czechia has a relatively strong Supreme Audit Office (SAO / NKÚ) at the central level, but big blind spots in what can be audited, and an unfinished system of internal management and control inside public institutions. Together, this means:

• many risks are not systematically checked, and

• problems identified by auditors don’t reliably lead to structural fixes.

How it looks in Czechia right now

Supreme Audit Office – strong, but with big holes

• The SAO audits the management of state property and the state budget, including some funds from abroad.

• Crucially, it is not authorised to audit:

  • finances of municipalities, towns and regions in their self-governing capacity,

  • or companies co-financed by the state or by self-governments. nku.cz+1

Given how much money and how many strategic investments flow through municipalities, regions and mixed-ownership companies (transport, hospitals, utilities, development firms), this is a major structural limitation.

Internal management & control – reform stuck in mid-air

• As early as 2014, a government policy statement promised:

  • a new law on internal management and control,

  • stronger managerial accountability,

  • and expanded powers for the SAO, plus fewer overlapping ex-post controls. vlada.gov.cz

• A decade later, progress is partial and uneven. NKÚ’s own strategy and cross-cutting reports emphasise that the same systemic problems keep reappearing in different audits – which is exactly what you expect when internal control systems remain weak and fragmented. whistleblowingmonitor.eu+1

So: a strong “top” audit office, but large parts of the public sector – especially local and mixed entities – lie outside its remit, and internal control reforms are incomplete.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Large “blind zones” in public money flows
   Municipalities, regions and public-owned or co-owned companies handle huge investment programmes (transport, hospitals, housing, utilities), but SAO cannot directly audit their finances. Local auditing exists, but without a central, independent view it’s harder to see systemic waste, design flaws, or patterns of manipulation.Czech Interior Ministry+1

2. Control without enforced follow-through
   NKÚ repeatedly identifies design flaws in programmes (vague objectives, poor controls, weak outcome metrics). Yet because there’s no hardwired mechanism that forces ministries or other bodies to redesign programmes and report on corrective actions, many issues reappear in later audits.whistleblowingmonitor.eu+1

3. Managers can hide behind “the system”
   If an audit reveals serious problems, it is easy for leaders to say:

“These are systemic issues, many actors are involved, we will issue new guidelines.”
Without clear, personal managerial responsibility for implementing fixes, the system encourages collective alibis, not bold corrective action.

1. Reactive rather than preventive
   Weak internal control means problems are often discovered:

   • late (after several years),

   • by external audits or criminal investigations,

   • when damage is already large.
     This delays learning and makes big projects feel dangerous – which, in turn, discourages ambitious, innovative initiatives.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• The state struggles to assure citizens and partners that large transformation programmes (green transition, digitalisation, infrastructure, health) are managed with consistent rigour across the whole public sector.

• Leaders know that if something goes wrong, they may be personally exposed years later, even though the system gives them weak tools to proactively design out risks. This encourages overly cautious behaviour and under-investment in transformative projects.

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E2 – Weak anti-corruption policy & political accountability

What this is

Czechia is not among the worst countries on corruption, but it’s clearly stuck in a mediocre band, with:

• persistent scandals,

• an underpowered anti-corruption strategy, and

• limited visible political accountability.

That corrodes trust and narrows the space for serious reforms.

How it looks in Czechia right now

Corruption Perceptions Index

• Transparency International’s CPI 2024 gives Czechia a score of 56/100 (0 = highly corrupt, 100 = very clean), ranking 46th out of 180 countries. Prague Daily News+3Transparency.org+3Transparency.org+3

• Compared with the previous year, Czechia dropped five places and lost one point, widening the gap vs. the EU average.Transparency International+1

• TI and media explicitly link this to weak anti-corruption efforts, lack of political accountability, and persistent problems in public procurement and lobbying. Expats.cz+1

High-profile scandals

• In February 2025, Czech police and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) arrested 22 people and charged 16 in a suspected €160 million EU-fund fraud case at Motol University Hospital, involving alleged manipulation of public procurements and kickbacks. Reuters

• This followed other EPPO-led investigations into public hospital supply contracts.Reuters

These cases reinforce a long-running narrative: public procurement and large EU-funded investments remain vulnerable, and political leadership has not built a convincing track record of cleaning this up.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Low trust → tiny space for painful but necessary reforms
   When citizens assume “they’ll just steal it anyway”, any proposal that:

   • changes pensions,

   • restructures healthcare funding,

   • or launches large infrastructure programmes
     meets instinctive scepticism. This shrinks the political room for long-term reforms, especially those that require short-term sacrifice.

2. Anti-corruption as PR, not system change
   If anti-corruption strategies are:

   • delayed, watered down, or

   • designed mainly to tick EU boxes,
     actors inside the system learn that this is symbolic politics, not a real constraint. That reduces the deterrent effect and weakens pro-integrity norms.

3. High “silent cost” of mediocre governance
   The visible scandals are only the tip of the iceberg. More damaging, long-term, are:

   • sub-optimal procurement choices,

   • misaligned subsidies,

   • regulatory capture and lobbying that distort policy choices.
     This accumulates as lost growth, lower productivity, worse public services.

4. International reputation and investment climate
   Being mid-table in the CPI is not catastrophic, but it sends a clear signal:

“You will face some integrity risks here; oversight is imperfect and politics can be messy.”
That makes it harder to attract top-tier investors and research partners, especially for long-horizon, capital-intensive projects.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Anti-corruption weaknesses hollow out the effectiveness of almost every policy instrument – from procurement to subsidies and regulation.

• They also reduce the quality of people willing to enter politics and public service: highly ethical, high-competence professionals are less likely to join a system perceived as ethically compromised.

• All of this directly reduces the state’s ability to lead and execute credible long-term strategies.

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E3 – Whistleblowers & internal reporting systems

What this is

Whistleblowers are the early warning system of any complex organisation. They expose corruption, waste and design flaws that no external auditor can see in time.

In Czechia, whistleblower protection has been:

• implemented late,

• under EU pressure, and

• is still fragile in practice.

How it looks in Czechia right now

Delayed transposition and EU sanction

• The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive required member states to adopt implementing laws by 17 December 2021.

• Czechia missed this deadline and only adopted national legislation in 2023.

• On 6 March 2025, the Court of Justice of the EU ordered Czechia to pay a €2.3 million lump-sum fine for failing to transpose the directive in time and fully.Whistleblower Network News+3Curia+3Reuters+3

Protection still largely “on paper”

• Commentaries by NGOs and monitoring projects describe Czech whistleblower protection as formally present but weak in practice:

  • low awareness among employees,

  • weak trust in internal reporting channels,

  • fear of retaliation and career damage. Lexology+1

• There are documented cases where restructuring or organisational changes were used in ways that appear retaliatory against internal critics – signalling that the culture has not caught up with the law. Reuters

Why this is critical for actionability

1. The system loses its internal “immune cells”
   Many serious issues (fraud, collusion, systemic dysfunctions, waste) are first visible only to insiders.
   If they have no trusted, protected channels to report, problems:

   • persist for years,

   • blow up only when they are already very costly,

   • or are leaked directly to media in a chaotic way.

2. Culture of “keep your head down” hardens
   When people see that whistleblowers are punished or isolated, the rational behaviour is:

“This is not my problem, I’ll look away.”
That kills internal learning and reinforces the broader culture of risk-aversion and alibism.

1. Reforms lose granular feedback from the front line
   Whistleblowing is not only about corruption. It also captures:

   • bad policy design,

   • absurd procedures,

   • unintended consequences for users.
     Without this feedback, reform leaders fly blind: they don’t see where implementation is failing until after large-scale rollout.

2. Formal compliance instead of cultural shift
   Many institutions may set up the minimum required internal channels to comply with the law, but:

   • don’t invest in awareness,

   • don’t provide robust, independent investigation processes,

   • don’t guarantee protection in practice.
     That’s classic Czech legal formalism: directive ticked, systemic problems unchanged.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Without credible whistleblower protection, the state lacks one of the cheapest and most powerful tools for discovering its own failures early.

• That makes every big reform more fragile and more expensive: errors are corrected late, after public scandals or EU interventions, rather than during controlled internal course-corrections.

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E4 – Public procurement, “lowest price” culture & vulnerability to manipulation

What this is

Public procurement is the main engine for public investment and a huge part of GDP. In Czechia, it’s characterised by:

• a strong “lowest price wins” culture,

• limited use of quality and life-cycle criteria,

• complex rules that push contracting authorities to play it safe,

• and periodic scandals.

How it looks in Czechia right now

Dominance of the lowest price criterion

• Academic work on Czech procurement shows that contracting authorities strongly prefer to evaluate tenders by lowest bid price:

  • in one large sample, 86.5% of public contracts were awarded this way. IDEAS/RePEc+2ResearchGate+2

• The current National Public Procurement Strategy notes that contracts awarded solely on lowest price still dominate – around 80% – and that Czechia ranks among the EU countries using this criterion the most. sovz.cz+1

• Importantly, research finds no clear evidence that using lowest price reduces the final cost of contracts; in complex projects, it can actually increase overall costs once quality problems, delays and change orders are considered. IDEAS/RePEc+1

Structural vulnerability and scandals

• Public procurement in Czechia is decentralised: many contracting authorities run their own tenders, often with limited in-house capacity. portal-vz.cz+1

• The Motol hospital case under EPPO, involving alleged manipulation of large EU-funded contracts, is a vivid recent example of how vulnerable high-volume procurement can be. Reuters+1

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Cheap upfront ≠ good value overall
   When “lowest price” is the default:

   • quality, reliability, interoperability and life-cycle costs are sidelined,

   • bidders can underbid, then later rely on change orders and extras to recoup margins,

   • complex IT, construction and service contracts are especially prone to under-specification and later disputes.

   Research explicitly concludes that preferring lowest price is inappropriate for complex contracts, as it does not guarantee cost-effectiveness. IDEAS/RePEc+1

2. Block on strategic and innovative purchasing

   If the state wants to:

   • drive digital transformation,

   • support green technologies,

   • or buy cutting-edge solutions,

   it must be able to use multi-criteria evaluation (quality, performance, innovation, life-cycle costs). A culture dominated by lowest price:

   • discourages innovative suppliers,

   • favours incumbents who know how to “play the rules”,

   • and leads contracting authorities to avoid more sophisticated criteria out of fear of challenges.

3. High risk of manipulation and clientelism

   A system that relies on:

   • complex legal procedures,

   • overworked and risk-averse contracting staff,

   • and single-criterion (price) evaluation

   is easier to manipulate through:

   • tailored specifications,

   • orchestrated bids,

   • collusion among suppliers.

   Recent EPPO investigations and corruption cases show how procurement steps can be exploited for illicit gain. Reuters+1

4. Paralysis by fear

   Because public procurement is:

   • legally complex,

   • closely watched by auditors, media and prosecutors,

   many contracting authorities take the safest possible path:

   • choose lowest price to avoid disputes,

   • avoid negotiation and innovation,

   • minimise subjective judgement in evaluation.

   This may reduce personal risk for officials, but it cripples the state’s ability to use procurement as a strategic tool.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Public procurement is the main lever to implement digital state, modern infrastructure, health system upgrades, school modernisation, green transition.

• When the procurement system:

  • over-weights lowest price,

  • under-weights quality and innovation,

  • and is highly vulnerable to manipulation,

  then every major transformation agenda becomes:

  • slower,

  • more expensive in life-cycle terms,

  • and less effective than it could be.

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F1 – Chronic low trust and weak perceived political voice

What this is

Even when formal democratic institutions work (free elections, pluralism, basic rule of law), democracy can be functionally weak if:

• citizens do not trust key political institutions, and

• they feel they “have no say” in what the system does.

Czechia is a textbook case of a democracy with very low trust in political institutions and a strong sense of distance between citizens and the political class.

How it looks in Czechia right now

Extremely low trust in parties, parliament and government

According to the OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (2024):

• only 14% of people in Czechia report high or moderately high trust in political parties,

• 19% trust the national government,

• 20% trust the national parliament. OECD+1

These are among the lowest levels in the OECD. Trust in the civil service (34%), courts (50%), police (60%) and local governments (44%) is significantly higher. OECD+1

This is consistent with other research: Czech democracy is formally stable, but no political institution has long-term majority trust.UCL Discovery+1

Perceived lack of political voice

The same OECD data show that people who feel “the political system doesn’t let people like me have a say” trust the national government 36 percentage points less than those who feel they do have voice.OECD

A significant share of the population simply does not experience Czech democracy as a system where their participation matters between elections.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Reform legitimacy is eroded from the start

Any ambitious reform (pensions, healthcare, education, housing, climate, AI, security) needs:

• short-term pain or uncertainty,

• long-term, diffuse benefits.

Low trust + low perceived voice → baseline reaction:

“They’re doing this to us, not with us. It’s probably for their own benefit.”

That pushes politicians into micropolitics and symbolic gestures, not structural changes.

2. Polarisation and openness to anti-system narratives

When mainstream institutions are seen as self-serving, it becomes easier for:

• populists and radicals to claim exclusive representation of “ordinary people”,

• external actors (e.g. Russian disinformation) to amplify distrust and cynicism.Studentská sekce IIPS+1

This doesn’t always show up as open conflict, but as chronic cynicism and “nothing will change” mentality, which is even more damaging for long-term mobilisation.

3. Professionalisation of politics without social anchoring

Czech politics is increasingly dominated by:

• professional politicians and party staff,

• technocratic experts in ministries,

but without deep organisational roots in society (low party membership, weak local branch life). This makes it harder to:

• mobilise citizens for reforms,

• build coalitions around difficult trade-offs,

• tap into societal expertise and energy.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• The state can formally decide almost anything. But its capacity to get collective buy-in is low.

• Every big reform is perceived as “their project”, not “our project”, which:

  • increases resistance and sabotage,

  • reduces compliance,

  • and encourages policy reversals when power shifts.

In practice, this means Czech democracy has a weak “mobilisation engine”: it can produce governments, but struggles to produce shared long-term missions.

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F2 – Fragmented, volatile party system and populism

What this is

Czech party politics has gone through:

• high fragmentation,

• the rise of new parties and movements,

• and a strong populist actor (ANO / Babiš) dominating recent cycles.

The system is still competitive and pluralist, but coalitions are complex and the incentive structure pushes toward short-termism and winners/losers logic, not stable cross-party projects.

How it looks in Czechia right now

Volatility and fragmentation

• The 2021 election saw two pre-electoral coalitions (SPOLU and PirSTAN) formed partly as anti-Babiš alliances. This decreased pure fragmentation (fewer separate lists), but increased ideological diversity within coalitions, making stable programme coherence harder. Czech Journal of Political Science

• The 2021–2025 period was governed by a five-party coalition, which had to balance widely different priorities.Wikipedia+1

Return of a strong populist bloc

• In October 2025, ANO led by Andrej Babiš won the parliamentary election with about 35% of the vote; voter turnout was high (~69%). Wikipedia+2The Guardian+2

• Coalition negotiations with far-right and strongly Eurosceptic partners (SPD, Motorists, Stačilo!) have raised concerns about:

  • policy volatility on EU and NATO alignment,

  • the stability of democratic norms,

  • and potential conflicts over rule-of-law and media independence. Financial Times+2AP News+2

Overall, the party system is not collapsing, but it is strained: mainstream parties are under pressure, while populist and radical actors gain leverage.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Coalition engineering dominates over long-term reform coalitions

Governments are assembled through complex coalition arithmetic, often with:

• narrow majorities,

• internal ideological contradictions,

• and strong personality clashes.

This makes it hard to:

• commit credibly to reforms that span multiple electoral cycles,

• sustain policies when the coalition changes,

• avoid “policy zig-zag” (especially in energy, foreign policy, taxation, education).

2. Every issue becomes a partisan battlefield

In a polarised environment with strong populist vs. anti-populist framing:

• reforms are evaluated not on substance but on which camp supports them,

• cross-party deals on strategic issues (e.g. climate transition, demographic aging, AI governance, defence) are politically risky,

so parties prefer short-lived symbolic victories over deep compromises.

3. Populism simplifies complex trade-offs

Populist narratives (from left and right) tend to:

• deny the existence of hard constraints (demographics, fiscal limits, EU rules, security commitments),

• blame elites, foreigners, or “Brussels” for all trade-offs,

• promise painless solutions (more benefits + lower taxes + less regulation).المركز الديمقراطي العربي+2SPCR+2

This makes realistic long-term strategies harder to sell and maintain.

4. Electoral competition punishes strategic honesty

Parties that articulate complex, realistic reform packages risk being crushed by simpler populist messages. Without institutional mechanisms that reward long-term responsibility (e.g. independent fiscal councils with teeth, binding medium-term plans, broad pacts), politicians rationally choose short-term survival.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Strategic issues that require multi-cycle continuity (pensions, health system redesign, climate adaptation, industrial policy, defence modernisation) are vulnerable to disruption whenever coalition arithmetic changes.

• The state’s external credibility (EU partners, investors, allies) is weakened because future policy direction depends heavily on volatile political competition and populist waves.

• Internally, ministries and civil servants hesitate to invest in deep reforms that might be reversed after one election, reinforcing a culture of low ambition.

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F3 – Weak institutionalised participation & co-creation beyond elections

What this is

Modern democracies need more than periodic elections. For high-quality, actionable democracy you want:

• structured ways for citizens, civil society, business, academia, municipalities, and regions to co-create policy,

• participatory and deliberative mechanisms that translate social knowledge into policy design.

In Czechia, these mechanisms exist in pockets, but they are weak, fragmented and under-used.

How it looks in Czechia right now

Limited tradition of participatory democracy

• Policy that systematically encourages democratic participation of youth “does not have a long tradition” in Czechia, partly due to the communist past where genuine participation was impossible. This is reflected in generally low participation in youth organisations and low political participation of adults. national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu

• Many forms of participation (petitions, local initiatives, citizen councils) are used, but often ad hoc, without strong institutionalisation or feedback loops.is.muni.cz+1

Consultations and councils as formalities

• Ministries and central agencies run consultations, advisory councils, working groups – but OECD and other reviews note that evidence-informed and participatory policy-making are still underdeveloped: input from stakeholders is often late, fragmented or symbolic. OECD+2SPCR+2

• There are some good examples (e.g. specific strategies with multi-stakeholder steering groups), but no strong system architecture that makes co-creation the norm.

Digital tools underused for democratic engagement

• While e-petitions and online campaigns exist (e.g. Milion chvilek), they are mostly civil society initiatives, not integrated into official channels with clear procedures for response and follow-up. is.muni.cz

• Digitalisation of government has focused more on service delivery than on deliberation and participation.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Policies are designed without the “real-world operators” at the table

When reforms in education, health, social services, security, or digitalisation are designed mainly inside ministries with limited structured input from:

• front-line workers,

• professionals,

• local governments,

• NGOs and businesses,

they are more likely to:

• misjudge incentives,

• underestimate implementation constraints,

• provoke avoidable resistance.

2. Citizens experience politics as something done “over their heads”

Without meaningful participation channels, citizens’ main tools are:

• periodic elections,

• occasional protests or viral campaigns,

• private exit strategies (emigration, self-protection, cynicism).

This reinforces the distance between state and society and amplifies the trust problem from F1.

3. No systematic way to aggregate dispersed intelligence

Czechia has high human capital in many pockets (tech, academia, municipalities, NGOs, professional associations). But current institutions do not systematically harvest this intelligence into:

• policy design,

• piloting and evaluation,

• continuous improvement.

So the state’s policies are less innovative and less grounded in practice than they could be.

4. Reform fatique and “participation theatre”

When participation is invited but:

• poorly prepared,

• not transparently reflected in the final decisions,

• and not followed up,

stakeholders learn that it is participation theatre. They disengage or radicalise, both of which reduce the system’s capacity for constructive change.

Effect on the state’s ability to move the country forward

• Without robust participatory and deliberative mechanisms, the state cannot transform latent social energy into practical reform coalitions.

• Policies lack the distributed ownership needed for difficult implementation, especially when they require behaviour change by professionals or citizens.

• This leaves the Czech democratic system procedurally intact but substantively weak: politically legal, but strategically under-powered.

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G1 – Information disorder, foreign influence & cyber / hybrid threats

What this is

Czechia isn’t just dealing with internal confusion and low-quality information; it’s also a front-line country for:

• Russian disinformation and hybrid operations,

• Chinese cyber-espionage and influence,

• and broader “information disorder” amplified by social platforms (TikTok, Facebook, Telegram).

This doesn’t just distort opinions – it directly attacks the state’s ability to build consensus for reforms and maintain basic security.

How it looks in Czechia right now

1. Russian disinformation & hybrid interference

• Analyses of Russian hybrid operations describe Czechia as a prime target: an EU and NATO member with relatively high polarisation and low trust. Campaigns combine:

  • disinformation,

  • psychological manipulation,

  • and coordinated online activity,
    aimed at undermining democratic stability and pro-Western orientation. Studentská sekce IIPS+1

• Pro-Russian content spreads actively on Czech social media, including a visible presence on TikTok ahead of elections, blending anti-system narratives, conspiracy theories and anti-EU/anti-NATO messaging. english.radio.cz+1

2. Cyber campaigns & espionage

• In 2024–2025, the Czech government formally accused APT31, a Chinese state-linked hacking group, of a “malicious cyber campaign” against the Foreign Ministry’s communications network since 2022; NATO, the EU and the US backed Czech accusations. AP News+1

• In 2025, Czech intelligence services helped dismantle a Belarusian spy network operating across Europe, underlining that foreign intelligence services are actively exploiting Schengen mobility and local vulnerabilities. AP News

3. Systemic assessment of disinformation resilience

• Comparative studies on disinformation resilience rank Czechia as vulnerable but improving, noting:

  • past underestimation of the problem,

  • limited early coordination,

  • and the gradual rise of specialised units and NGOs focused on information resilience. edmo.eu+3Association for International Affairs+3Prism UA+3

Why this is critical for actionability

1. It erodes the shared reality needed for reforms
   If large portions of the population consume divergent, manipulated information ecosystems, it becomes almost impossible to build broad agreement on:

   • what problems exist,

   • what trade-offs are real,

   • which reforms are necessary.
     Without a minimum shared factual baseline, any reform can be painted as a “conspiracy”.

2. It weaponises existing distrust and grievances
   Foreign operations don’t create divisions from scratch; they amplify:

   • historical resentments,

   • social inequalities,

   • frustrations with corruption and incompetence.
     That makes it harder for any government – even well-intentioned – to gain enough trust to carry out long-term changes.

3. It distracts and overloads the state
   Ministries, security agencies and public institutions must devote significant resources to:

   • monitoring information operations,

   • responding to cyber incidents,

   • firefighting media narratives.
     This is energy not spent on proactive reforms.

4. It raises the cost of political courage
   Politicians who push serious reforms (defence spending, sanctions, support for Ukraine, energy transition) are targeted by disinformation and smear campaigns, increasing personal and electoral costs. That discourages bold, long-term decision-making.

Net effect on the state’s ability to move forward

• The information environment becomes a battlefield instead of a space for rational deliberation.

• Hybrid threats force the state into permanent defensive mode, making long-term strategic steering much harder.

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G2 – Declining media trust & fragile role of public service media

What this is

Media – especially public service media (ČT, ČRo) – should be core infrastructure for:

• trustworthy information,

• pluralistic debate,

• and democratic resilience.

In Czechia, media trust is low and contested; public service media are important but politically vulnerable, just as they’re being asked to help fight disinformation.

How it looks in Czechia right now

1. Low and declining trust in news media

• Research on media trust in the Czech Republic shows a long-term decline, with many citizens seeing journalists as biased, corrupt or captured by political and business interests. is.muni.cz

• Public service media still enjoy higher trust than many private outlets, but trust is politically polarised and easily weaponised in public debates.

2. Public service media as anti-disinformation actors – with contested mandate

• Recent debates and draft amendments propose explicitly tasking Czech public service media with combating disinformation or, in a modified version, with “contributing to media literacy”. PSSI | Prague Security Studies Institute

• Expert analyses welcome the idea but warn that:

  • giving PSB a formal anti-disinformation mandate risks politicising them further.

  • they need clear, well-designed safeguards to protect independence while expanding their role in information resilience. PSSI | Prague Security Studies Institute+1

3. PSB as drivers of resilience

• Cross-country research suggests that regular use of public service media in democratic countries is associated with higher resilience to disinformation and higher trust in journalists. Taylor & Francis Online

• In Czechia, this potential is underexploited because PSB are simultaneously:

  • expected to be impartial,

  • pushed to fight disinformation,

  • and targeted in political struggles over boards, funding and editorial independence.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Without trusted intermediaries, everything becomes partisan

   If citizens don’t have broadly trusted news sources, then:

   • every reform narrative is consumed through partisan filters,

   • fact-checks and corrections are treated as “propaganda”,

   • conspiracy and rumour fill the vacuum.

   That makes reasoned debate on complex reforms extremely hard.

2. Public service media can’t fully play their systemic role

   Ideally, PSB would be:

   • stable, well-funded,

   • strongly independent,

   • explicitly tasked with in-depth explanation of public policy issues,

   • and backbone institutions for media literacy and fact-based debate.

   In reality, they spend a lot of energy defending their own independence and funding, limiting their ability to invest in long-horizon public interest journalism.

3. Media market pressures reward outrage and simplification

   Commercial outlets, operating in a competitive digital market with weak trust, often:

   • simplify complex issues into conflict narratives,

   • prioritise click-driving content,

   • underinvest in in-depth investigative and explanatory reporting.

   This pulls the whole information environment towards short-term outrage, not long-term understanding.

Net effect on the state’s ability to move forward

• The state lacks a robust, broadly trusted media “backbone” to explain reforms, surface trade-offs and correct falsehoods.

• Public debate becomes noisy, polarised and shallow – which directly undermines policy stability and reform continuity.

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G3 – Media literacy, digital skills & education gaps

What this is

A resilient democracy in an LLM-/social-media world needs citizens who can:

• critically evaluate information,

• understand algorithmic feeds,

• and navigate digital risks.

In Czechia, there are important initiatives on media literacy, but they coexist with:

• inconsistent integration into schools,

• uneven digital skills,

• and broader educational challenges.

How it looks in Czechia right now

1. PISA and digital use

• In PISA 2022, Czech students scored above the OECD average in mathematics, reading and science, but performance has stagnated or declined compared to earlier cycles, and inequalities remain. OECD+1

• PISA data show that moderate, structured use of digital devices for learning correlates with higher performance, but heavy or unstructured use is associated with lower scores – underlining the importance of how digital tools are integrated, not just whether they are present. csicr.cz

2. Media literacy sector – patchy but growing

• EDMO’s mapping of the Czech media literacy sector notes that media literacy used to be marginal in education policy, but:

  • the rise of disinformation and hybrid threats,

  • and the proactive role of the Ministry of Interior and specialised institutions,
    have spurred new monitoring, analytical and educational initiatives. edmo.eu+1

• NGOs, think tanks and public institutions run projects on:

  • fact-checking,

  • media education in schools,

  • training journalists and public officials.

  However, these efforts are often project-based and not fully integrated into core curricula.

3. Uneven skills and generational gaps

• Surveys and expert commentary indicate that:

  • older generations are vulnerable to email / Facebook misinformation and chain hoaxes,

  • younger people are heavily exposed to TikTok, Instagram and YouTube recommendation loops,

  • teachers often don’t feel fully equipped to address algorithmic feeds, influencers, or AI-generated content in the classroom. edmo.eu+1

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Citizens’ ability to evaluate reform narratives is limited

   If large parts of the population:

   • struggle to distinguish credible sources,

   • don’t understand how content is personalised,

   • or are unfamiliar with manipulation tactics,

   then any complex reform (climate, AI, pensions, defence) can be easily undermined by simple misinformation frames.

2. Teachers and schools are not fully mobilised as resilience hubs

   Czech schools could be the central infrastructure for information resilience, but:

   • media and digital literacy competences are not yet fully mainstreamed or resourced,

   • teachers often lack support and training to handle fast-changing digital environments,

   • systemic links between security / media-literacy actors and education policy are still evolving.

   That leaves a lot of potential unused.

3. Inequalities in information skills translate into political inequality

   Groups with strong media and digital literacy can:

   • better defend themselves against manipulation,

   • join debates more effectively,

   • leverage information for opportunities.

   Others are more easily captured by simplistic or extremist narratives. This creates unequal voice and vulnerability in the democratic process.

Net effect on the state’s ability to move forward

• Even well-designed reforms hit an electorate that is heterogeneous in its ability to understand, evaluate and debate complex information.

• Without a systemic push on media/digital literacy, the gap between policy complexity and public comprehension widens, fuelling distrust and polarisation.

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G4 – Weak, fragmented evidence-informed policymaking ecosystem

What this is

Beyond media and public opinion, the state also needs a strong “knowledge engine”:

• data, statistics,

• research and evaluation,

• think tanks and expert bodies,

• structured interfaces between science and policy.

In Czechia, this ecosystem exists but is:

• fragmented,

• underused,

• and not fully embedded into decision-making.

How it looks in Czechia right now

1. OECD Public Governance Review & JRC report

• The OECD Public Governance Review (2023) finds that Czechia has many elements of evidence-informed policymaking, but:

  • capacity is uneven across ministries,

  • the centre of government plays a limited role in orchestrating evidence use,

  • and there is a “patchwork” of analytical units without a coherent system. OECD+1

• The European Commission’s 2025 report “Building capacity for evidence-informed policymaking in the Czech Republic” confirms this, highlighting:

  • lack of clear standards and incentives for using evidence,

  • ad-hoc rather than systematic engagement with researchers,

  • limited skills in data analysis and evaluation in many parts of the administration. Government of the Czech Republic+2OECD+2

2. Science–policy interface

• A Mutual Learning Exercise on bridging science and policy in Czechia emphasises that:

  • science-informed policymaking can improve policy coherence across sectors,

  • but institutional mechanisms to link researchers and policymakers are still underdeveloped. Výzkum a vývoj v ČR+1

• Many ministries commission research, but:

  • results may not be integrated into strategy,

  • evaluation findings are not systematically used to redesign programmes,

  • and long-term partnerships with universities and think tanks are patchy.

3. Data, evaluation and learning culture

• Across the administration, there’s limited:

  • routine use of impact evaluations,

  • ex-post reviews of major reforms,

  • transparency about “what worked / didn’t work”. OECD+1

• This connects with problems we already described (formalism, risk-aversion, alibism): if outcomes aren’t measured and discussed, learning doesn’t happen.

Why this is critical for actionability

1. Policies not grounded in robust diagnosis

   Without systematically using evidence:

   • reforms are often based on political intuition, lobbying or partial data,

   • structural causes of problems are missed,

   • imported “best practices” are not adapted to local conditions.

   That makes reforms fragile and prone to failure in implementation.

2. No strong “reality check” on political promises

   Independent, institutionalised evidence systems (fiscal councils, advisory bodies, evaluation agencies) can:

   • flag unrealistic promises,

   • quantify trade-offs,

   • and give cross-party political cover for tough choices.

   In Czechia, such mechanisms are relatively weak or fragmented, so the political marketplace is dominated by unconstrained narratives.

3. Limited capacity to course-correct

   When policies do not deliver:

   • it is often unclear why,

   • feedback is not systematically collected,

   • redesign is slow and politically costly.

   That leads to “policies on autopilot” – continuing programmes that don’t work because there is no strong, data-driven impetus to change them.

4. Underuse of Czech scientific and analytical talent

   The country has strong research institutions and analytical capacity in academia and NGOs, but the institutional interfaces and funding mechanisms to integrate their work into policy are weaker than they could be.Výzkum a vývoj v ČR+1

Net effect on the state’s ability to move forward

• Czechia has an “information-rich” society in terms of data and research, but a governance system that is not yet information-driven.

• This gap means that even politically feasible reforms may be technically sub-optimal, slow to adapt, and less credible to domestic and international partners.